absence of a compelling argument. 4 It would suggest that Martin must do more than merely defend the disjunctivist account from skeptical assault.
5
Indeed, one might wonder whether the folk even have the concept that philosophers associate with "veridical visual experience." So one might doubt whether there is a pretheoretical conception of veridical visual experience to rescue from skeptical critique.
Admittedly, if our concept of visual experience is theoretical in nature, the theory is an extraordinarily old one, as philosophers since at least Aristotle have discussed cases in which the appearances of objects vary without change in the objects themselves.
Why is it that to those who are very drunk everything seems to revolve in a circle, and as soon as the wine takes hold of them they cannot count objects at a distance . . .? Is it because the vision is continually disturbed by the heat of the wine? The same thing then happens to those who are drunk as when an object appears double if one puts it close to the eye. (Problems 874a; 1984 , 1346 In his famous discussion of "Skepticism with Regard to the Senses," the young Hume lumps this observation together with others made in the intervening millennia. 4 I have in mind here an argument like Hilary Putnam's (1975) famous case for the conclusion that the meanings of our words are not in our heads. Chalmers and Clark (1998) argue for an externalist account of the memories, thoughts and other semantic "vehicles" that we commonly suppose are in our heads, an externalism that resembles Martin's in greatly exceeding Putnam's conclusions about meaning or semantic content. 5 Might Martin just mean by "having a veridical visual experience of x" what the folk mean by "seeing x"? It is telling that Susanna Siegel, before critiquing Martin's view, feels she must inform the reader of a departure from ordinary thought and talk. "Throughout this essay, I'll use 'veridical experience' to pick out instances of perception [e.g. seeing] that are not hallucinations or illusions. So there will be no such thing as a veridical hallucination in this sense of 'veridical'" (2008, 205) . Once the concept associated with "veridical experience" is distorted in this wayonce it becomes analytic that hallucinations are inaccurate-"veridical experience" may well be cognitively equivalent to "seeing" and the events to which both terms apply may well have objects as their essential constituents and so differ (in at least this way) from even perfect hallucinations. (The question I am asking is whether Siegel could have achieved the same effect by saying, "'Having a veridical visual experience of x' is herein to be read 'seeing x'.") At any rate, I choose to think that Martin is not pushing for linguistic or conceptual reform. On the reading of the texts I find most natural, Martin is merely arguing (albeit on wholly a priori grounds) for naïve realism, where this implies no more than that having a veridical visual experience of something is a great deal like seeing it in that both events essentially involve an experienced/seen object as an extra-mental constituent. (That is, on my reading, Martin treats naïve realism as a synthetic-albeit an a priori knowable-truth.) I suspect that Martin also embraces the associated property identity-that having a veridical visual experience of something just is seeing something-but I am unsure of this, as there are passages-e.g. (2004, 294) -in which Martin seems to countenance veridical hallucinations. 6 While of unquestionable antiquity, the authorship of Problems is disputed.
second sphere, a sphere removed from the "common and natural" position occupied by its original, even though I know that there is no sphere at this second location. After the depression, things are not entirely as they look.
It seems, then, that the conception of visual experience we get from a simple experiment known to philosophers for thousands of years is of something in the head that represents things outside the head in either an accurate or inaccurate manner. It is not, therefore, the naïve realist's conception of visual experience.
Now, what does all this show? It shows that when Martin writes of how "sensory experience seems to us to be just through reflection" he must not have in mind the experiments of Aristotle and Hume and the lessons common sense draws from them. It would seem, that is, that Martin is not using "reflection" to denote the hybrid of observation, introspection, and inference described above. For that method of thought leads us away from naïve realism towards a distinctively representational view of experience.
Let's call the form of reflection driving Aristotle and Hume "a-introspection" and characterize it as follows.
A-Introspection: Forming beliefs about one's feelings, thoughts, and experiences making full use of any experiments, observations and inferences that seem relevant.
Clearly, a-introspection involves introspection properly so called, as Aristotle and Hume rely on introspective judgments about the "doubling" that marks their visual experience when their eyeballs are depressed or the object before them is too close to clearly see. But a-introspection clearly involves much else besides introspection. Introspective judgment has no extra-conceptual (or pre-conceptual) preliminary.
I have argued elsewhere that Shoemaker's critique of the narrow perceptual model of introspection is too ambitious (Zimmerman, 2008) . Though our introspective knowledge of our beliefs and thoughts is indeed wholly non-perceptual in nature, our knowledge of our sensations and experiences resembles paradigmatic perceptual knowledge in various respects. For instance, in stark contrast with our thoughts and beliefs, we can quite easily describe mistaken judgments about our own experiences that don't have their source in irrationality or conceptual confusion.
And a careful examination of these mistaken judgments unearths at least some evidence of cintrospective awareness of visual experience.
The phenomenon is perhaps most clearly exemplified by a scenario Gareth Evans discussed:
Consider a case in which a subject sees ten points of light arranged in a circle, but reports that there are eleven points of light arranged in a circle, because he has made a mistake in counting, forgetting where he began. Such a mistake can clearly occur again when the subject reuses the procedure in order to gain knowledge of his internal state: his report 'I seem to see eleven points of light arranged in a circle' is just wrong. (1982, Evans's subject does not have an irregularly malleable visual experience that morphs to match his miscalculations. Instead, he has a somewhat inaccurate view on the character and content of a largely stable stream of experience. He seems to see ten points of light in front of him, but he mistakenly thinks that he seems to see eleven.
There are at least three features of the case worth noting. First, the events it describes are fairly unexceptional. Relevantly similar cases can be described that don't involve numerical concepts, as when one is asked by a doctor to characterize bodily discomfort and mistakenly describes gas pain as nausea, or is asked by a cook to identify the flavors of a complex broth and mistakes the taste of lime for that of vinegar. Second, Evans's case lacks even the faintest whiff of irrationality. The subject he describes is guilty of nothing more exotic than a failure to keep track when counting. Third, and most importantly, the example demonstrates that cognitive or conceptual acts like counting often intervene between the enjoyment of a visual experience and the formation of an introspective belief or judgment affirming the existence and character of that experience.
Admittedly, it would be odd to posit a (second-order) seeming-experience that intervenes between one's (first-order) visual experience and the introspective belief or judgment that one is enjoying that experience. And since visual experiences do intervene between the extra-mental objects we see and our knowledge of the existence of those objects, introspective knowledge of experience and perceptual knowledge do differ in this important respect. But we have seen that introspection of experience resembles perception in an equally important way. Both acts require categorization, counting, and other conceptual preliminaries. And when these preliminary acts of conceptualization are unsuccessful-as when Evans' subject miscounts-mistaken introspective judgments can result. In consequence, there are introspective errors similar in kind to errors of perceptual judgment.
10 10 These reflections rebut Martin's (2006, 407) claim that one must either: (a) accept (second-order) introspective appearances to which our (first-order) experiences needn't conform; (b) posit an infallible mechanism of introspection; or (c) deny, as Martin does, that we have "a distinct perspective on our inner lives from that we take when experiencing the [extra-mental] world" (2006, 407) . I have argued that we have a "distinct perspective" on our "inner lives." It is constituted by our (second-order) introspective beliefs about-and, perhaps, our cintrospective awareness of-various first-order states of mind (experiences of spheres and the like). On this view, At the very least, then, the relation between our introspective judgments and our experiences can be seen to be different in kind from that which obtains between our first order beliefs and thoughts and our (second-order) introspective knowledge of them. Descartes' belief that he exists is self-verifying-the judgment is made true by its execution. And the same is probably true of Tyler Burge's (1988) class of cogito-like judgments: judgments of the form "I am thinking p." 11 But our introspective knowledge of our experiences is not like this. Indeed, the difference remains in view when we turn from our introspective knowledge of those thoughts we merely entertain to our knowledge of our own beliefs. Evans' subject does not figure out whether he believes that there are eleven points of light before him by turning his attention to his belief and counting. Instead, his knowledge of his belief is drawn directly from it (Zimmerman, 2006b ). In contrast, Evans' subject does turn his attention to his experience when determining how many lights he seems to see. He first becomes c-introspectively aware of that experience.
And only then, after (incorrectly) counting the lights he seems to see, does he form a (mistaken) judgment as to the number of lights he is experiencing. C-introspection is not only possible; it is a typical preliminary to b-introspective judgment.
There are, admittedly, other possible descriptions of the case that do not invoke cintrospective awareness of experience. One might insist, for instance, that Evans' subject can only exercise perceptual attention, and then either replace or augment its more natural productthe judgment that there are x number of lights in front of him-with the (wholly conceptual) judgment that he is having an experience of x number of lights. According to this line of this thought-which may indeed be Evans' take on the scenario-advocates of the perceptual model introspection is fallible, but not because our (first-order) experiences aren't always as they introspectively seem.
(Again, there are no seeming experiences intervening between our experiences and our knowledge of them.) Introspection is fallible because we can incorrectly conceptualize or categorize our experiences when formulating our introspective judgments. 11 See Zimmerman (2006a) for caveats.
of introspection mistake cases in which we more carefully focus our perceptual attention on external objects for cases in which we c-introspect upon the visual experiences that represent (or contain) those objects.
But this reply is not plausible in the case of hallucination. If Evans' subject is hallucinating ten lights, focuses his attention on what he takes to be the circle of lights before him, and then counts as best he can, he will of course think that he has focused his attention on the lights he can see. (He will think he is more carefully examining those points of light, not his experience of them.) But we will know, looking in, that his attempts to engage the mechanisms of perceptual attention were for naught. Since there were no lights there for him to see, he only succeeded in making himself more fully aware of features of his experience. And surely, it is introspection that makes one aware of these features of one's experience, not vision. Our subject's visual experience represented ten points of light arrayed in a circle before him. And, unbeknownst to him, when he tried to focus on the lights before him, he wound up dwelling upon those features of his experience that help make it a representation of said lights. He cintrospected. Now, though I think these considerations make the existence of c-introspection a reasonable conjecture, I will not pretend that they force its acceptance. And this is clearly not the place to evaluate the wealth of arguments that have been presented both for and against the perceptual model. So let us just suppose, if only for the moment, that reflection on Evans'
example (or its hallucinatory variant) has convinced us that Shoemaker is mistaken, and that we can indeed get an introspective fix on our visual experiences without conceptualizing or describing them as events of experiencing or events of seeing. With this assumption in place, we can allow our initial subject Max "thing-awareness" of his veridical visual experience of the sphere before him-a kind of awareness that cannot be equated with either his knowledge that he is having an experience of a sphere or his knowledge that he is seeing a sphere. So when Max cintrospects in this manner, will his experience seem to him to involve an extra-mental constituent?
To answer this question we must each do our best to c-introspect and report what we find.
So I encourage you to turn your attention to your visual experience and to verify whether the claims I am about to make jibe with those to which you are inclined. Surely, if there is such a thing as c-introspecting an experience of a sphere, there must be something that distinguishes this act from attentively focusing on a seen sphere, as attentively watching something isn't itself an introspective act. (Only primates can introspect, but many "lower" species can look, watch, and examine what they see.) But it seems that the only feature that could distinguish the two acts from one another is a difference in the focus of attention.
When I attentively focus on the sphere, I more carefully examine its shape, color and the like. In 12 Note that these are still instances of veridical experience. (They are neither hallucinations nor illusions.) I am still seeing the blurry object in view; as we representationalists would say, my experience still correctly represents the existence of this object despite mischaracterizing its color, shape and exact location. And yet, even if the disjunctivist is granted this, the view is still open to dispute. For, as
Martin admits, there will be cases in which a subject cannot tell via introspection alone whether she is hallucinating or instead enjoying a veridical visual experience. And when we consider cases in which a subject cannot tell via introspection whether she is, say, hallucinating a sphere or actually seeing one, it is natural to suppose that there is something common to both the hallucinatory and veridical experience beyond the mere fact that they cannot be told apart by the subject in question, where this further commonality explains why the subject cannot tell these experiences apart.
14 There are actually several forms such explanation might take. First, we must ask whether b-introspection is preceded by c-introspection in the case. Does the subject merely judge that her visual experience has not changed despite the move from veridical experience to hallucination?
Or does she ground this judgment in some more primitive (non-conceptual, quasi-perceptual) act of c-introspection? Next, we must decide which features of the subject's experience cause and 13 My worries may be well founded. On the basis of a (rather limited) survey of those philosophers who publish their introspective reports, Hellie (2007, 266-9) argues that "phenomenological study" of our experiences provides support for something like naïve realism. 14 This is a common criticism of disjunctivism ably mounted by Siegel (2004, 218-23) ; Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006, 179) ; Byrne and Logue (2008, 89-90); and Tye (2009a, 560 But what is striking about disjunctivism, is its incompatibility with any such theory. For the disjunctivist's commitments prevent him from accepting any substantive explanation of introspective indiscernibility.
We can make this criticism more precise by concisely stating the explanatory thesis metaphysical disjunctivists must reject.
Substantive Explanation of Introspective Indiscernibility (SEII): If a mature, reflective subject judges on the basis of careful introspection that her (relatively simple) visual experience before t is the same as her experience after t, where one of these experiences is hallucinatory and the other veridical, her experience before t must be similar to her experience after t along some dimension, where the similarity in question explains (i.e.
causes and rationalizes) her judgment that nothing has changed.
The disjunctivist must reject SEII. For if there were a positive (representational or qualitative) characteristic common to both hallucinatory and veridical visual experience, we could use this characteristic to pick out the genus of which both kinds of experience are species (Martin, 2006, 367) . And this would impugn the disjunctivist's claim that hallucination and veridical experience of a sphere are not members of a natural or non-disjunctive kind. They would instead be experiential representations of a sphere, or experiences of the qualitative kind: sphere*. Thus, it seems that even if we grant the disjunctivist the phenomenological support he claims for himself, we can rationally reject the position on offer as explanatorily impoverished. Now Martin tries to reply to this critique by arguing that no explanation of the introspective indiscernibility of hallucinatory and veridical experience is necessary (2006, . We can, he thinks, fully characterize the agent's "perspective" when she is hallucinating by saying that she cannot discriminate her situation from one of veridical visual experience (ibid.).
So we needn't say that she is then aware of some positive (representational or qualitative)
features of her experience: features that would equally qualify her experience were she actually seeing something external to her mind. Of course, it is not uncommon to say that on both occasions it looks to the observer "as though" there is a sphere before her; and it is not uncommon to say that "what it is like" to enjoy a perfect hallucination of a sphere is no way differs from what it is like to really see one. But, in Martin's view, what we're trying to convey here is just the fact that we cannot tell the two episodes apart. "It looks to the observer in both cases as though there is a sphere in front of her" and "What its like to see a sphere in no way differs from what it is like to vividly hallucinate one" do not state facts of similarity from which sameness in experiential kind can be inferred.
Might this be true? The first thing to note is that the view is unattractive as stated.
Suppose we focus on a case in which a subject, Sam, sees a sphere before him right up until the moment at which the sphere is removed and he begins to enjoy a perfect hallucination of it.
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When we ask Sam whether anything has changed (in either the sphere or his visual experience of it), he will honestly answer in the negative, as it looks to Sam as though nothing has changed.
And those of us who reject Martin's disjunctivism will explain Sam's inability to discriminate the hallucination from the veridical perception in terms of what we at least take to be distinct facts about Sam's experience. Despite the disappearance of the sphere, Sam's experience of it has remained qualitatively the same, and his experience still represents to be the case precisely what it did before. But Martin must insist that these quite natural explanations are defective.
According to the disjunctivist, our descriptions are either false, or they fail to assert anything beyond the fact that Sam cannot tell his two different experiences apart. But why should we abandon our explanatory practices as Martin requests? Because veridical experience (purportedly) seems to us to involve objects when we c-introspect upon it? But why should the latter consideration weigh more heavily in our thinking than the former? Why not save SEII by rejecting the (purported) introspective appearances on which Martin relies?
An Internal Tension in Martin's Reply
We have seen that neither a-introspection nor b-introspection provides support for naïve realism, and that Martin must therefore accept the existence of c-introspection if he is to provide the least shred of evidence for naïve realism and the disjunctivist conception of hallucination and veridical experience he bases upon it. Moreover, as we have also seen, Martin maintains that no explanation of the introspective indiscernibility of veridical visual experience and perfect hallucination should be provided. Since all such explanations depict hallucination and veridical experience as species of a common genus, the disjunctivist must reject them all. But there is a tension here. For in arguing against SEII-and so against substantive explanations of introspective indiscernibility-Martin would seem to reject the very existence of substantive introspective knowledge. And in so doing, he robs himself of the only potential source of support for his belief in naïve realism.
Martin's argument for why we need not explain why subjects cannot tell their perfect hallucinations apart from their veridical experiences hangs on the idea that introspection is importantly different from perception. Though the sphere that Sam can see is, for example, distinct from Sam's initial visual experience of it-as the sphere is an extra-mental objectMartin claims that Sam's visual experience of the sphere is not distinct from his introspective awareness of that experience. On Martin's lights, we don't need to explain why Sam judges that nothing has changed when his experience shifts from veridical perception to perfect hallucination because the fact that his experience remains qualitatively or phenomenologically the same is nothing beyond his introspective sense that nothing has changed in it.
However things seem from the subject's perspective with respect to her phenomenal consciousness is how phenomenal consciousness must be…
The subject's perspective on her own sense experience constitutes sense experience being that way for her .
. . If she really is in a situation in which from her perspective it is as if she is having an experience as of a white picket fence, then that constitutes her being in the situation of having an experience as of a white picket fence. (2006, Now I think is natural to read these statements as claiming a kind of infallibility for our introspective judgments. And if this reading is correct, Martin must deny the very cogency of There is a problem, however, with endorsing this line of reasoning and following Martin along a train of thought that would seem to lead him from the infallibility of our introspective judgments to a denial of SEII. And this is just the patent implausibility of the claim that introspection is infallible in the sense we have described. Surely, Evans' subject is just wrong that he seems to see eleven points of light. Surely, our introspective judgments are sometimes mistaken. Of course, as we have already noted, there are indeed important differences between perception and introspection. But fallibility is something the two sources of knowledge would seem to have in common.
It is perhaps because of these worries that Martin swears off the natural reading of the text that we have been considering. The disavowal comes when Martin confronts the Wittgensteinian objection that infallible knowledge isn't really knowledge at all. If my opinion on some matter can't be wrong, the Wittgensteinian protests, its truth isn't much of an achievement; and, the critic continues, knowledge must be won, not awarded by default. So if our introspective judgments really can't be wrong, they can't really constitute knowledge.
In reply to this sort of objection, Martin says that "a subject's perspective on her own mind" is not meant to denote her beliefs and judgments about how things seem to her.
The constitutive connection is between the subject's perspective on his or her own mind, how it seems to be, and how his or her mind then is. This need not be identified with the judgments he or she actually makes. (2006, 392, fn.42) Presumably Martin is not just saying that the subject's perspective on her experience need not be identified with her introspective judgments. Instead, the reader is being told that she should not so identify the introspective perspective when interpreting Martin's But even if we suppose that Sam's initial veridical visual experience of the sphere somehow "doubles" as his awareness of such, Martin must tell some story about how this minimal form of introspective awareness might somehow morph into the full-blown judgment that the sphere is an essential constituent of that experience. For recall that Martin does not support his assertion of naïve realism by citing experiments, observations and inferences.
Instead, the view is supposed to be motivated by introspection or "reflection" alone. But how exactly is a belief in naïve realism supposed to emerge from introspection when a subject's introspective awareness is nothing more than the (suitably embedded) experience of which she is aware?
We can bring the problem this question poses more clearly into focus by shifting our discussion from our imagined subject Sam to Martin, the theorist himself. To do this, let us suppose that Martin is enjoying a veridical visual experience of a lavender bush in bloom before him. How does Martin transition from his minimal introspective awareness of this visual experience-an awareness that is supposed to consist in his suitably embedded visual experience of the blooming bush-to his confident judgment that this experience involves the lavender bush as one of its essential constituents? Surely a veridical visual experience of a bush is not itself a belief in naïve realism. But Martin says nothing about how a subject might transition from the one to the other.
In sum, Martin argues against SEII by claiming that introspective awareness of a visual experience of a mind-independent object is nothing more than that very experience embedded in a suitably sophisticated mind. And it is clear why he argues for this extraordinarily minimalistic conception of introspection. For if introspective awareness of experience were more substantial than this, it would be hard to see how it could be infallible. And if introspection were fallible, folk psychologists would be right to explain its successes in cases like Sam's by appealing to those positive representational features his hallucination and veridical experience of the sphere have in common; features that justify and render true his belief that his experience has not changed; features that are not present when, as sometimes happens, a subject mistakenly judges that nothing has changed in her experience. But Martin cannot consistently characterize introspection in this minimalistic way. For naïve realism is supposed (by Martin) to derive its support from introspection alone. And it is clear that Martin must characterize introspection in a more substantial light if he is to convince us that it really does provide evidence for a naïvely realistic conception of veridical visual experience. Indeed, it is hard to see how Martin's varying descriptions of introspection-invoked, as they are, in response to two very different challenges to his view-might be unified in such a manner as to leave his case for disjunctivism intact.
Disjunctivism and Psychological Explanation
Visual experience doesn't just interact with our beliefs about it. Crucially, psychologists of both the folk and academic varieties invoke experience to explain beliefs about external objectsbeliefs that are not themselves preceded by introspection upon experience. And it can be seen that many of these beliefs respond to hallucination and veridical perception in exactly the same way. Thus, reflection on cases reveals that we often treat a subject's hallucinatory and veridical experience as equivalent in kind when explaining her efforts to render correct perceptual judgments. And Martin has not successfully argued for the impropriety of this practice.
To illustrate the kinds of folk psychological explanation I have in mind, let's suppose that Sam initially sees not one large sphere before him, but ten small ones, and that at some point he begins to hallucinate the spheres without being able to tell that a change has taken place. There are two variations to consider.
In one case, Sam is asked how many spheres are before him prior to the onset of his hallucination, and after correctly counting them up, he concludes there are ten. Now a third party asked to explain what has occurred will no doubt point out that both Sam's eyesight and his ability to count were involved. For in the absence of either he would not have correctly ascertained the number of spheres. But to arrive at something more determinate than this our folk psychologist must run afoul of one of the two differing philosophical theories on hand, as each offers a different account of just how looking and counting operated to affect Sam's response. On Martin's account Sam has a veridical visual experience of the spheres, and correctly counts the spheres that partly constitute that experience. According to the representationalist, Sam has a veridical visual experience of the spheres and he correctly counts the spheres his experience represents.
But now suppose that Sam isn't asked for the number of spheres until the hallucination has already begun, and that he again does his best to count and arrives at the conclusion that there are ten spheres before him. Now in this case, the two theories will diverge. 
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So we must ask: When our ordinary subject explains the two cases under discussion will she embrace the disjunctivist's conclusions? Again, I have only my own case to go on, but I predict that you will join me in a negative answer. When explaining Sam's answer in the veridical case our folk psychologist will feel pressed to cite the very same relation between looking and counting that obtains when Sam hallucinates. Again, Martin's disjunctivism runs into implausibility. We are left looking for a good reason to revise the common sense psychological practice that we have identified.
To be clear, I am not denying that various facts about Sam's thinking, reasoning, and acting are best explained by adverting to the (necessarily spheres-involving) fact that he sees ten spheres. His successfully sorting the spheres into two groups of five is surely a fact of this 16 Note that an operation of conceptualization can be shaped and informed by (or based on) an experience without its being about (or of) that experience. (Sam's counting the spheres can be based on his experience of them without his therein counting his experience or elements of it.) See Evans (1982, 227) for discussion.
kind. 17 But we have limited our view to cases in which "visual experience" is used to explain someone's judgments or behavior, so explanations in terms of "seeing spheres" or "seeing that there are spheres" are beside the point. And it is instructive to note that the fact that Sam might correctly sort the spheres in the veridical case couldn't have a corollary in the hallucinatory case, for when he is hallucinating, Sam can't find any spheres to sort. Indeed, it is because Sam counts those spheres he seems to see in precisely the same way in both of our initial scenarios that we feel compelled to provide a uniform explanation of what has happened. The commonality in effect calls out for a commonality in cause. We posit a single experiential origin to explain a remarkable similarity in cognitive result. Williamson (2000, 60-4) for cases in which we quite naturally cite an agent's factive (or external-objectentailing) states of mind to explain her actions. Cf. Pettit (1986) and Child (1994, 204-16 But this just brings Martin to rest on the dilemma's second horn. For suppose that he instead adopts a negative characterization of introspective indiscriminability by allowing that two experiences are indiscriminable so long as the subject enjoying them is not disposed to judge them different. The dog is not disposed to judge that his hallucination of sausage is different form his veridical experience of such because he cannot make-and so isn't disposed to makeintrospective judgments of any kind. So the negative characterization of introspective indiscriminability correctly classifies both events as experiences of sausage. But then the dog also lacks a disposition to judge that his veridical experiences of his ball and his bowl of water differ from his veridical experiences of sausage. In consequence, the negative characterization of introspective indiscriminability incorrectly classifies as experiences of sausage the dog's veridical visual experience of his ball and water bowl (2004, 97) . In sum, the positive characterization that Siegel considers is too strong, and the negative characterization too weak.
Martin (2006, replies to this objection by invoking an "impersonal" notion of introspective indiscriminability-a strategy explicated and endorsed by Scott Sturgeon (2006 Sturgeon ( , 2008 . To say that the dog's perfect hallucinations of sausage are introspectively indiscriminable from veridical visual experiences of such is not to say that the dog would judge them the same.
It is instead to say-speaking impersonally now-that these events just cannot be told apart after even the most careful efforts to introspect. Introspecting a difference between them is, to use Martin's phrase, "impossible simpliciter," and not just impossible for this or that subject or species (2006, 381) . Correlatively, to say that the dog's veridicsl experiences of sausage are introspectively discriminable from his veridical experiences of balls and bowls of water is not to say that he can tell these experiences apart. It is just to say-without relativizing to the dog or any other subject-that they can be told apart on the basis of introspection. When we are trying to give an account of what sausage experience is, we should feel free to idealize in this manner, Sturgeon suggests, just as we should feel to idealize when giving an account of doxastic rationality in terms of logical omniscience and full probabilistic coherence (2006, When doxastic rationality is supposed to consist in logical omniscience and full coherence it is not at the same time supposed to account for our real-world, real-time judgments and decisions. We invoke these idealizations to characterize the working of an ideal mind and the norms to which many ordinary thinkers aspire, but we must instead cite the non-idealized properties of the reasoning processes of (non-ideal) people to provide adequate explanations of their real-world, real-time beliefs and actions. Indeed, modern economic theory is learning precisely this lesson from behavioral economists. You can use idealized conceptions of rationality when constructing a model of ideal economic activity. But if you can replace these idealizations with a more realistic description of the processes that actually generate our beliefs and choices you will invariably arrive at better explanations and predictions of our actions and the economic system they embody.
So which event drove Sam to judge there to be ten spheres before him? His non-ideal, all-too-real hallucination of ten spheres. And which features of this hallucination best explain why it had this effect on his judgment? Its non-ideal, all-too-real representational and qualitative features. Sam's perfect hallucination is indeed impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical visual experience of ten spheres. But when he doesn't in fact introspect upon that experience, and he doesn't in fact mistake it for a veridical experience of ten spheres, the observation that Sam's hallucination is (in some impersonal sense) indiscriminable from a veridical perception does not enter into (much less exhaust) the best folk psychological explanation of the judgments to which this experience actually gives rise.
Scientific Explanation
What then of scientific psychology? I suspect that investigation of Sam's nervous system would find exactly the same interactions between the neural correlates (or realizations) of counting and visual processing occurring both before and after Sam begins to hallucinate. That is, though it is an empirical conjecture-a conjecture that could only be conclusively verified by impracticably (and immorally) producing a series of perfect hallucinations through surreptitious cortical and (perhaps) retinal stimulation-I suspect that there is no neurological difference between veridical perception and perfect hallucination, nor any difference in the impacts these events have on the neural realization of counting at a distance and the judgments of number in which such counting issues. And since the neural realizations of perfect hallucination and veridical visual experience will turn out to be identical, and the two will turn out to have identical impacts on many of the forms of cognition to which vision is essential, neuroscientists will be tempted to infer that the realizers of hallucination and veridical visual experience are species of a single neurological genus. Won't they then infer that this neurological genus is the correlate or realizer of visual experience: the folk psychological genus of which veridical visual experience and hallucinatory experience are both species? I suspect that they will, and that Martin's claims about the intuitive nature of naïve realism will not move them from this stance. Only an explanatory or predictive advantage could tempt a neuroscientist to alter her interpretation of the results I think likely.
And Martin's theory of experience offers neither.
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Of course, Martin might reject my predictions as unlikely or overly speculative (as would Fish, 2009, ch. 5) . Or he might just ignore them altogether. But even if he focuses exclusively on folk explanation, the case against disjunctivism will not go away. For, as we have seen, we folk do introduce a common experiential kind to explain commonalities in the perceptual judgments of those who are seeing and those who are merely hallucinating. Neither folk nor scientific psychology recommends Martin's disjunctivist view.
Conclusion
I have argued at length that Martin is mistaken when he says that our reflective conception of visual experience is only accurate if naïve realism is true. Introspection does not support but actually undermines naïve realism. This is especially true of conceptual forms of introspection.
When a subject reflects on the fact that he is seeing something he thinks of what is happening in a naively realistic light, but when he reflects on the distinct fact that he is having a veridical visual experience of something, he thinks of what is happening in representational terms. Martin thus needs to invoke non-conceptual introspective awareness of experience (c-introspection) to motivate the naively realistic picture of veridical visual experience on which his disjunctivism is based. But it is hard to see how Martin can countenance c-introspection while at the same time 18 Based on a careful examination of contemporary vision science, Tyler Burge (2005, 22) argues for a "Proximity Principle" on which, holding fixed background psychology, the same proximal stimulation of the visual system will yield tokens of the same perceptual state type regardless of differences in distal cause. (Burge's phrase "proximal stimulation" is meant to include light striking the retina, though because this light needn't have been reflected off the surface of an object, Burge countenances analogs of perfect hallucination: illusory perceptions-entertained in the absence of external objects-that have the same proximal origins as-and so are type identical to-the veridical experiences from which they are introspectively indiscernible.) Burge is surely right about the contemporary science, so the predictions I've made in the text are conservative.
